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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the effect of Objective-1 regional transfers on the per-capita income 
growth performance of EU NUTS-3 regions during the budgetary period 2000-2006. To be 
able to distinguish a causal effect and account for possible endogeneity a quasi-experimental 
regression-discontinuity design is employed. This strategy relies on the arbitrary set 75%-rule 
for Objective-1 fund eligibility. The findings generally suggest a positive effect of the funds 
to promote growth in low-income regions. However, the country affiliation of recipient 
regions seems to be of great importance to the effectiveness of the funds in promoting growth. 
Moreover, evidence point to the transfers affecting different regions in different ways. 
Regions just below the threshold and some regions in older member states seem better at 
utilizing received funds. This thesis suggests that a regions absorptive capacity is closely 
linked to the institutional environment.          
Keywords: Structural Funds, Regional growth, Regional Convergence, European Union, 
Regression-discontinuity design, Quasi-experimental methods.  
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1. Introduction  
The differences in regional per-capita incomes in Europe are vast. For example, in 2006 the 
richest region in the European Union, West Inner-City London, had a per-capita gross 
regional product (GRP) of €140,400 measured in purchasing power standard, that is about 23 
times higher than the poorest region in the union at the time, the Latvian region of Latgale. 
Indeed, the eastward expansion of the EU in 2004, and the subsequent entry of ten new 
member states, increased regional income differences within the union dramatically, as the 
average per-capita GRP of the new entry countries amounted to about 50% to that of the old 
member states.  
To alleviate regional inequalities the EU had as far back as 1988, in connection with the 
Single Market Act and the entry of then relatively low-income, southern-European, countries 
into the union
1
, set up the so called Structural Funds Program. The objective of these funds is 
to promote regional cohesion in the EU. As this is a stated goal in the EU treaty and seeing as 
the Structural Funds amounted to about one third of the entire EU budget in the 2000-2006 
budgetary period (see e.g. Monfort 2008; Mohl and Hagen 2010), regional cohesion can 
certainly be said to be of utmost importance to the union. In the budgetary period of 2000-
2006 Structural Fund transfers where separated into three groupings; Objective 1, Objective 2 
and Objective 3. The Objective-1 transfers are aimed at increasing investment and growth 
rates in the poorest regions of the union and will be the focus of this thesis. The poor regions, 
eligible for Objective-1 funding, are defined as those regions with per-capita GRP below 75 
% of the EU average (EC 1999). 
Puga (2001) summarizes the early evidence on regional income inequality in the EU, 
observing that up to the mid-eighties income inequalities between member states amounted to 
about half of the total income inequality in the EU. However, Puga notes that since then 
inequalities among member states diminished at the same time as inequalities within states 
increased. Consequently, the majority of income inequalities in Europe today are explained by 
inequalities within member states, contrary to between-country inequality. According to Puga, 
Europe is experiencing a process of convergence among countries at the same time as a 
process of divergence among regions. Thus, there seem to exist a place for policies targeted at 
reducing regional income disparities. 
                                                 
1
 Greece joined 1981, and Portugal and Spain in 1986 
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From an empirical perspective a few prior studies have looked at the impact of the Structural 
Funds on regional growth outcomes. The evidence ranges from the Structural Funds having a 
positive impact (e.g. Dall’erba 2005; Ramajo et al. 2008; Becker et al. 2010) to a non-existent 
(e.g. Dall’erba and Le Gallo 2008; Sala-i-Martin 1996; and, Boldrin and Canova 2001).  
The aim of this thesis is to evaluate the effect of the Structural Funds on the per-capita gross 
regional product (GRP) growth performance of EU regions during the period 2000 to 2006. 
Specifically, the focus will be on the effects of Objective-1 funds to promote growth in this 
period among NUTS3-regions
2
. Drawing from previous literature (see e.g. Becker et al. 
2010), it is reasonable to assume Objective-1 investments having mostly long-term effects. 
Hence, this thesis will also considers the growth performance of regions in the period 2000-
2006 that received transfer in the preceding budgetary period, 1994-1999. To be able to 
estimate a treatment effect and to account for possible endogeneity, this evaluation will be 
done employing a quasi-experimental framework, explicitly a regression discontinuity design 
(see e.g. Angrist and Pischke 2009; Lemieux and Imbens 2008; and, Lee and Imbens 2009), 
utilizing the arbitrarily set 75%-rule for Objective 1-fund eligibility. The analysis is similar to 
that carried out by Becker et al. (2010), but focuses more on the most disaggregated level of 
regional data in the EU, adds novel approaches of spatial econometric estimation techniques 
to the study and explicitly looks at the long-term effects of transfers.  
Different theoretical approaches give different predictions on how economic integration and 
regional transfers can be expected to affect regional convergence in incomes. For example, in 
the neoclassical Solow-Swan growth framework (Solow 1956; Swan 1956) regional transfers 
help poor, capital-scarce, regions to accumulate capital and stimulate faster growth rates. In 
the long run regional transfers help the poor regions to catch-up, to converge, to the richer 
regions. This convergence comes from the assumption of diminishing returns to capital. 
As a contrast, new growth theory, or endogenous growth theory, considers returns to capital to 
have increasing returns (see e.g. Romer 1986, 1990). In this view, investments in innovation 
and human capital may work against the diminishing returns to capital through the 
                                                 
2
 Following Eurostat (2007), the NUTS-system (Nomenclature of Territorial Units of Statistics) is a hierarchal 
regional classification system with four regional levels; NUTS-0, -1, -2 and -3 (NUTS 0 corresponding to 
country level and NUTS 3 being the most disaggregated level). The system was established by Eurostat to 
provide a comparable regional breakdown of the EU member states. The NUTS regional system is set up after 
three principles. First, it is set within a specific population threshold (minimum 150 000 and maximum 800 000 
inhabitants for the NUTS 3 classification). Second, for practical reasons the NUTS regulations also tries to 
follow the member states’ national administrative units to as large extent as possible. Lastly, the NUTS 
regulation follows suitable natural geographical units. The three distinctions are made to keep the regional units 
within as functional economic units as possible, while still retaining as much of the national administrative 
divisions of each member state. 
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externalities associated with such investments, fostering increasing technological growth rates 
and, thus, income growth (Aghion and Howitt 2004). Hence, if regional policies promote 
investment in education, R&D and other innovation-inducing policies they can affect the 
growth rates of regions, albeit not necessarily convergence (Mohl and Hagen 2010).  
Moreover, new economic geography (NEG) (Krugman 1991; Krugman and Venables 1995; 
Fujita et al. 1999) shows how economic integration can give rise to a core-periphery pattern 
and, thus, possibly divergence between regions due to the existence of agglomeration 
economies. In this view regional policy, for example in the form of investments in public 
infrastructure, may actually be harmful to convergence as it reduces transport costs and thus 
increases agglomeration economies, since it is now cheaper to produce in one location (Mohl 
and Hagen 2010). Besides, by this perspective it is also doubtful if regional aid to the 
periphery is warranted. Instead, higher aggregate growth can be achieved by supporting core 
regions, as these generate innovation and drives income growth in the entire economy 
(Baldwin and Martin 2004). Moreover, NEG models point to the importance of spatial growth 
spillovers between regions.    
The findings in this thesis point towards a general positive effect of Objective-1 transfers on 
regional growth outcomes in the budgetary period of 2000-2006. However, if spatial 
spillovers and country-fixed effects are accounted for this positive effect all but disappears. 
This would indicate that country belonging is of great importance in explaining the effect of 
regional transfers on the growth outcomes of regions. Moreover, evidence point towards 
Objective-1 transfers having a stronger effect for relatively richer recipient regions. Lastly, 
the findings on the long-term effect of Objective-1 transfers suggest that regions within a 
group of old member states have benefited more than others.  
The above reported results can be indicative of the importance of the absorptive capacity of 
the region, essentially the regions ability to get a “bang for the buck” when it comes to 
utilizing the regional funds. Regional absorptive capacity is closely linked to the skills, 
knowledge and institutions present in a region and has been pointed out as a key determinant 
in generating economic growth (see e.g. Caragliu and Nijkamp 2008; Rodriguez-Pose and 
Crecenzi 2008). If this interpretation is to be believed simple capital transfers are not enough 
to lift lagging regions from poverty. Instead, training, education or institutional reforms are 
equally important and will allow regions to benefit from transfers. This line of research, on 
which regions that benefit from regional transfer, should be pursued in the future. However, it 
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should be noted that the period studied in this essay is fairly short and that the results probably 
would benefit from data from more budgetary periods. 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 deals with a range of different 
theoretical approaches on regional convergence and how regional transfers can be expected to 
affect convergence in light of these theories. In chapter 3 a short critical review off previous 
empirical findings is carried out. Chapter 4 discusses the empirical methodology and 
specification employed in the thesis. After this, in chapter 5, the empirical estimations are 
carried out and presented. Lastly, in chapter 6 the results are summarized and implications are 
discussed. 
2. Theoretical views on regional convergence and transfers 
2.1. Neoclassic growth theory and regional transfers  
In the neoclassical growth view, e.g. as in Solow (1956) and Swan (1956), increased 
economic integration, as in the EU, will lead to increased convergence in incomes between 
poor and rich regions. As economic barriers are lowered, the factors of production will flow, 
by migration or trade, between economies until the rate of return on each is equalized.  
Following Aghion and Howitt (2004), in the basic Solow-Swan type model the production 
function can be described, in Cobb-Douglas form, as: 
          ,     (1) 
where Y is the output, A represents the productivity, K and L are stocks of capital and labor in 
the economy, respectively. To assure convergence the production function must have the 
following properties: 
  
  
  , 
   
   
   and      . 
That is to say, in equation (1) the marginal productivity of capital must be positive but 
diminishing with respects to capital inputs and the function must exhibit constant returns to 
scale.
3
  
By dividing (1) with L we get the per-capita relationship: 
     .      (2) 
                                                 
3
 With the additional assumptions of       
  
  
   and       
  
  
  . This is usually referred to as the Inada 
condition and is necessary to able to reach a closed solution.  
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The prediction of the Solow-Swan model suggests that given the same production technology 
regions starting out with a lower capital-labor ratio, k, will grow faster compared to regions 
starting out with a higher capital-labor ratios. This comes from the assumptions of 
diminishing returns to capital. As the only difference between the regions is the level of 
capital, the initial capital-scarce regions will eventually catch up with the initial capital-rich 
regions.  
Following this a negative relationship between initial per-capita incomes and average growth 
rates can be expected. This relationship (in log-linearized form) can for a region i be stated as: 
   
 
 
   (
   
    
)              ,    (3)  
where t indicates the beginning of a period and T its end,  α and β are constant terms, with 
        and 0<β<1, and ui is a disturbance term meant to reflect temporary shocks to the 
economy. The implied condition of b>0 ensures an inverse relationship between the average 
growth rate,   , and the initial per-capita income level,     . In equation (3) β represents the 
speeds at which regional incomes converge to a long-term equilibrium, if the only thing that 
differs between regions are their capital-labor ratio this interpretation of convergence is often 
referred to as absolute convergence.  
On the other hand, if production technology differs between regions it can be expected that 
regions do not converge to the same level and that other region-specific effects besides the 
initial per-capita income level determines the growth rate and outcome, so called conditional 
convergence (see e.g. Islam 1995). Following Durlauf (2003) and re-defining equation (3) as:  
                       ,    (4) 
Where, if    ,  Xi,t  represent such region-specific effects. In the Solow-Swan model such 
differences can, in addition to regional dissimilarities in capital-labor ratios and technology, 
be differences in regional savings rate or population growth rate (Aghion and Howitt 2004). 
In this case the interpretation of   is that it represent the speed of convergence to each 
region’s (or group of regions’) long-term equilibrium, which is based on its region-specific 
characteristics.    
In the neoclassical view regional transfers fosters growth by financing a higher degree of 
capital in poor regions, thus both increasing the rate of per-capita incomes growth and the 
convergence rate (Dall’erba and Le Gallo 2007). Note that all effects of regional transfers on 
growth rate outcomes in the neoclassical growth setting are transitional. Transfers only 
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increase growth rates temporarily, as they can only speed up the convergence process to each 
region’s equilibrium (in the absolute or conditional sense). However, if technology is not 
publicly available, regions might have different growth trajectories and regional transfers can 
also have a long-term role if they spread new production technology to regions.  
2.2. Endogenous growth theory and regional transfers 
The private-good quality of production technologies, contrary to the more public good 
approach implicitly assumed in the neoclassic setting, is also the starting point of the 
endogenous growth theory. This theoretical approach, initially developed by Romer (1986, 
1990), Lucas (1988) and Mankiw et al. (1992), questions the assumption of decreasing returns 
to capital and instead considers increasing returns to the factors of production. Following 
Aghion and Howitt (2004), in the endogenous growth view, innovation and technological 
change are at the center of economic growth. In this setting it is possible to affect the growth 
rate of technology by investing in R&D and human capital and thus spurring the rate of 
innovation in the economy and giving rise to increasing returns to capital. Such investments 
are thought to generate positive externalities, knowledge spillovers, which work against the 
diminishing returns, making the same amount of capital more productive. 
Consequently, the assumption of increasing returns to capital allow the rich, capital abundant, 
regions to invest in innovation-inducing activities to a higher degree than poor region. Thus, 
capital-abundant regions can keep up a higher growth rate indefinitely. As a consequence, 
regional income divergence, instead of convergence, is a very possible outcome.  
Drawing from the endogenous growth literature an additional variable needs to be added to 
specification (4) to represent regional knowledge spillovers. Continuing to follow Durlauf 
(2003) equation (4) is extended as: 
                           ,    (5) 
Where, if     ,       represents such knowledge spillover-inducing activities, for example 
investments in human capital and R&D.  
Traditionally, in the endogenous setting, regional transfers will only affect the convergence 
process if they affect the innovation capabilities of a region. However, for example, Barro 
(1990) shows that government spending also can have, at least initially, a positive impact on 
the growth rate of the economy. By investing in public infrastructure the government can 
increase the productivity of the production factors. In this way, regional transfers, that 
increase the productivity of factors by investing in physical capital, can also have a positive 
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impact on the growth rates of regions. However, as in the neoclassic setting, all such effects 
are transitional and do not increase the growth rate of the economy indefinitely.  
2.3. Agglomeration economies and growth 
The theoretical models considered so far have not taken space, and the propensity of 
economic activity to cluster in it, to agglomerate, into consideration. However, both in the 
neoclassic and endogenous growth approaches this has been shown to be of importance to the 
growth outcomes of regions. That geography matter to economic activity is often attributed to 
existence of spatially-bounded externalities. In the neoclassical or endogenous view such 
externalities are of often of an external, Marshallian, nature (Marshall 1920) and are mainly 
concerned with labor market pooling of related industries and labor flows between firms as an 
explanation of agglomerations (see e.g. Glaeser et al. 1992). However, there are other 
complementary views, for example New Economic Geography (NEG) considers other 
pecuniary externalities, which help explain why firms and people tend to cluster in space.  
Developed by Krugman (1991), Krugman and Venables (1995), Puga and Venables (1996) 
and Fujita et al. (1999), the NEG-models describes how interactions of scale economies, 
externalities and transportation costs explain how economic integration can lead to a 
agglomeration of economic activities and an uneven distribution of incomes. Firms will tend 
to cluster in nearby regions, the core regions, raising incomes there, and leaving more 
backwards regions, the periphery, behind with lower income. 
Following Ottaviano and Thisse (2004), in these core-periphery models it is often assumed 
that the economy consists of two sectors: one modern, characterized with increasing returns, 
perhaps services or high-tech industries; and one traditional sector, characterized by constant 
returns, say agriculture. These industries use two factors of production, often labor and 
capital. It is regularly assumed that one factor is mobile and one immobile (at least partially), 
often capital is considered the mobile factor. Furthermore, the economy is divided into two 
regions. As the two regions integrate and transaction costs are lowered, capital concentrates to 
the region with initially larger endowment of the increasing-returns industry where firms can 
realize larger scale economies. Eventually all firms in the increasing-return industry locates to 
one region, the core, pushing up local incomes, leaving the other region, the periphery, 
specialized in the constant-return industry, with relatively lower incomes. The mobility of the 
other factor of production, labor, further intensifies this process, to the point where it also is 
completely mobile and all economic activity concentrates to the core region.  
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There are several examples how endogenous growth dynamics have been added to the NEG-
framework to explain the link between agglomeration and growth (for an overview see e.g. 
Baldwin and Martin 2004). Following Martin and Ottaviano (1996), a possible tradeoff 
between, on the one hand, aggregate growth and, on the other, regional convergence emerges.  
Integration leads to more agglomeration through a higher degree of factor mobility along the 
lines of the core-periphery model. In turn, agglomeration economies increase the innovation 
rate because it lowers the costs of investment and innovation in the core. This is because both 
capital investments and innovation require an array of intermediate goods which, on account 
of lower transaction costs and scale economies, are less costly when produced in the core. A 
pattern of high aggregate growth allowed by a more efficient resource usage can therefore 
accompany increased regional income inequality. As a result there is a tradeoff between 
regional equality and aggregate growth. This tradeoff comes from the assumed localized-
geographical character of the knowledge spillovers in these models, as knowledge spillovers 
become more global the importance of the location of the firm in innovating diminishes and 
regional inequality lessen (Baldwin and Martin 2004). However, for example, Jaffe et al. 
(1993) and Anselin et al. (1997) have empirically showed that knowledge spillovers are 
strongly localized.  
Thusly, there are from several theoretical views reason to believe that spatial externalities are 
of outmost importance to the growth outcome of a region. In terms of model (5) this implies 
that not only the human capital and technology in the region i matter but also the growth rate 
in neighboring regions, j. Thus, to account for this (5) must be extended as: 
                                  ,   (6) 
where        is the spatially-weighted average of neighboring regions’ growth rates, with ρ 
as the spatial autoregressive coefficient that measures the extent of spatial externalities in the growth 
process.
4
  Thus, the regional growth rates are not only affected by its own initial incomes, but also by 
growth spillovers from neighboring regions (cf. López-Bazo et al. 2004; Egger and Pfaffermayr 2006; 
Le Gallo and Dall’erba 2006; Ertur and Koch 2007).  
2.4 Regional transfers in a model with geography and endogenous growth 
How can we expect regional transfer to affect the regional economy in a setting similar to that 
described above? Martin (1999) shows how regional transfers can enter in a model with 
endogenous growth, geography and localized knowledge spillovers. In this setting the type of 
                                                 
4
 See appendix I for a discussion of the construction of the weighting matrix, W. 
11 
 
regional transfers have an impact on the outcome of the growth-equity tradeoff. First, if the 
core region simply transfers capital to the peripheral region, e.g. a direct monetary transfer, 
this makes the poor region more attractive to firms, as the capital stock and thus the market 
demand increases. This, in turn, will decrease income differentials between the regions, as 
more firms locate to poor regions, raising real incomes, but also making the geography less 
conductive for innovation and growth, as agglomeration economies lessen in total due to 
fewer firms in the core.  
Similarly, if the regional policy takes the form of investments in the infrastructure
5
 within the 
peripheral region, Martin shows that again agglomeration economies lessen due to more firms 
locating in the poor region, on account of decreased transaction costs within the region. Thus, 
yet again, both regional income differentials and the aggregate growth rate fall.  
Lastly, there is the case of investments in infrastructure between regions. In this case Martin 
shows that more economic activity is concentrated to the core region, since transaction costs 
fall and it is made cheaper to trade directly with the periphery, as opposed to produce there. 
Thus, more firms concentrate to the core, the cost of innovating falls and the aggregate growth 
rate increases. Simultaneously, the geography of production and income is made more 
uneven.  
What then, in the setting of Martin, is a desirable regional policy? Martin suggests policies 
that reduce the cost of innovating. Such policies are shown to both increase the growth rate 
and decrease income differentials. First, directly, a lower cost of innovating increases the 
aggregate income growth in the economy simply because more innovations are created. 
Second, indirectly, a lower cost of innovating also increases the number of firms that can 
enter the market, thus pushing down monopoly profits for capital owners, and since the 
initially rich region has a larger share of capital owners, income differentials between the 
regions, as well as between workers and capital owners, lessen. This will in turn induce more 
firms to locate to the initially poor region, further decreasing income inequality. Thus, as 
Martin (1999, p.101) puts it:  
“If subsidies to R&D, increased competition on goods markets and labour 
markets, improved education, infrastructure, etc., can decrease the cost of 
innovation for firms, then, this kind of policy may yield more desirable outcomes 
than traditional transfers or regional policies.”  
                                                 
5
 Infrastructure in Martin (1999) is assumed to take the form of a decrease in transaction costs. 
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Taking into account that the rich region also needs to finance the regional transfers do not 
change the qualitative results of the model in any of the covered cases. However, if the cost of 
financing the decreased cost of innovation is higher than the expected increase in growth, the 
policy is of course not desirable. 
2.5 Hypothesis 
Thus, drawing from the discussions above there are reasons to both believe that regional 
transfers will have a positive and a negative effect on regional convergence. If neoclassical 
theory has any explanatory power it would be expected that the capital transfers from 
Objective-1 transfers would speed on the convergence process and recipient regions would 
grow faster than comparable non-recipient regions. This view features in much of the regional 
policies in the EU (see e.g. Monfort 2008).  
However, it is also possible that the endogenous growth dynamics are stronger in relatively 
richer regions, allowing them to grow faster and thus counteracting convergence. Moreover, 
as pointed out in NEG, if agglomeration economies are sufficiently strong and knowledge 
spillovers are geographically localized, this will also allow relatively richer core regions to 
grow faster than the relatively poorer peripheral regions. This thesis will implicitly test these 
theoretical statements by comparing the growth outcomes of recipient regions with non-
recipient regions. As the welfare effects of transfers are ambiguous in the presence of 
endogenous growth dynamics and agglomeration economies doing such an evaluation is of 
utmost policy importance.  
3. Prior studies on the effect of regional transfers in the EU 
The empirical evidences on the effect of regional transfers on regional incomes and growth in 
Europe are varied. Puga (2001) sums up the literature on regional income convergence up 
until the 2000s. According to Puga until the mid-1980s there seems to have been convergence 
among EU-regions in incomes. However, after this period most studies seem to point to 
regional income divergence, coinciding with the enlargement of the EU, regardless of the 
contemporary increase in regional transfers. Puga interprets this as a failure of the Structural 
Funds to induce convergence among Europe’s regions.  
Looking at the Structural Funds as a whole Sala-i-Martin (1996) and Boldrin and Canova 
(2001) all find equally pessimistic results on the effectiveness of the funds. However, 
Middelfart-Knarvik and Overman (2002) find positive effects of Structural Fund transfers on 
agglomeration and industry location at the national level. Similar positive evidence of 
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transfers on per-capita GDP growth on the national level is found by Beugelsdijk and 
Eijffinger (2005). 
To a large extent much of the early literature is lacking when it comes to causal 
interpretations, often due to weak or non-existent identification strategies that only allow for a 
correlative interpretation of the results. Thus, it is difficult to establish what the counter-
factual situation is, i.e. if the situation would have been even worse without regional transfers. 
In an excellent literature review Mohl and Hagen (2010) lists four problems affecting most 
prior studies to a varying degree: (1) biased estimates due to imprecise data or measurement 
errors; (2) biased estimates due to causal endogeneity; (3) biased estimates due to failure to 
account for the spatial dependence in the data; and, (4) biased estimates due to omitted 
variables. However, as methods evolve, more recent studies have employed a wide variety of 
methods to overcome these shortcomings. 
The results from studies trying to account for all or some of Mohl and Hagen’s (2010) list of 
problems are equally varied, Table 1 list some these findings. For example, Garcia-Milá and 
McGuire (2001) employs a panel with a difference-in-difference approach and investigates 
the effect of national and EU transfers to stimulate private investment and growth among 17 
Spanish NUTS-2 regions in the periods 1977-1981 and 1989-1992, finding that transfers are 
not effective in stimulating the economy in these regions. Similar evidence for the entire EU 
is found by Rodrigues-Pose and Fratesi (2004), who employs a fixed-effects panel on 152 
NUTS-2 regions over the period 1989-1999. These authors find that Structural Funds do not 
seem to have a positive impact on growth; however they also find that the effects are positive 
for funding aimed at education and human capital. Dall’erba and Le Gallo (2008) find that the 
Structural Funds have a positive but non-significant impact on regional convergence, looking 
at 145 NUTS2-regions also during the period 1989-1999, employing a cross-sectional spatial 
lag model with instrumental variables. Also, Mohl and Hagen (2008) find a non-significant 
impact of Structural Funds on regional growth for the period 1995-2005 employing a 
propensity score estimator.  
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Table 1. Some previous studies on the effectiveness of regional transfers in the EU 
Authors 
Results on 
effectiveness of 
regional transfers 
Time 
period Units Method 
Garcia-Milá 
and McGuire 
(2001) 
Not effective at 
stimulating overall 
investments or growth 
1977-
1981, 
1989-
1992 
Dummy for total 
transfers 
(national+EU funds), 
17 NUTS-2 regions 
(Spain) 
Differnce-in-
difference, Panel 
Rodriquez-
Pose and 
Fratesi (2004) 
Not effective at 
stimulating regional 
growth. Positive effect 
from investments in 
human capital and 
education. 
1989-
1999 
Obj.-1 payments (% 
GDP), 152 NUTS-2 
regions   
Cross-section 
OLS and FE 
panel 
Dall'erba and 
Le Gallo 
(2008) 
No impact on 
convergence 
1989-
1999 
Structural Fund 
payments (% GDP), 
145 NUTS-2 regions 
(EU12) 
IV, Spatial lag 
cross-section 
Mohl and 
Hagen (2008) 
Positive but 
insignificant 
1995-
2005 
Obj.-1, -2 and -3 
payments and 
remaining funds from 
1994-1999 (% of 
GDP), 122 NUTS-1 
and -2 regions 
(EU15) 
Generalized 
propensity score 
estimator, Panel 
Ramajo et al. 
(2008) 
Faster convergence for 
regions in cohesion 
countries 
1981-
1996 
Separate models for 
regions belonging to 
cohesion vs non-
cohesion countries, 
163 NUTS-2 regions 
OLS and Spatial 
lag model, cross-
section 
Becker et al. 
(2010) 
Positive growth effect 1989-
2006 
Dummy for Obj-1 
recipient regions, 
total 693 NUTS-2 
regions and 3301 
NUTS-3 regions 
Regression 
discountiuity 
design, panel 
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Mohl and 
Hagen (2010) 
Positive growth effect 1994-
2006 
Obj.-1, -2 and -3 
payments, 126 
NUTS-1 and -2 
regions 
OLS panel, IV 
by system-GMM 
panel and spatial 
lag model 
Becker et al. 
(2012) 
Positive growth effect 1994-
2006 
Total EU transfers, 
total 2078 NUTS-3 
regions 
Generalized 
propensity score 
estimator, Panel 
 
More positive results on the effect of the Structural Funds on growth are found by, for 
example, Ramajo et al. (2008), who find faster convergence rates among Objective-1 regions 
than for non-Objective-1 regions for the period 1981-1996 employing a cross-sectional spatial 
lag model. Additionally, Becker et al. (2010) find a positive and significant effect of 
Structural Funds for the period 1989-2006 for both NUTS2- and -3 regions, employing a 
similar regression discontinuity approach as this thesis. Likewise, Mohl and Hagen (2010) 
find that Objective-1 payments have a positive effect on regional growth rates during the 
period 2000-2006 using various panel and spatial panel approaches. More recently Becker et 
al. (2012), employing a propensity score estimator, find that Structural Fund payments 
increased the growth among NUTS3 regions for the period 1994-2006.  
Looking at the result from previous studies some general observations can be learned. Firstly, 
the effect of Structural Funds to promote growth appears to be very dependent on the period 
studied. Generally, the evidence point to the Structural Funds having little to no effect during 
the 1990s, but that this seem to have changed the further into the 2000s the studies look.  
Secondly, the effect also seem dependent on the length of the period studied. The studies that 
find a positive effect of Structural Funds on growth or convergence generally look at longer 
time periods. This speaks for the possibility of positive long-term effects of the Structural 
Funds in promoting growth.  
Furthermore, not all studies take spatial effects into account, even though Abreu et al (2004) 
shows that ignoring this can lead to unreliable results in the context of European regions. 
Indeed, both Dall’erba (2005) and Dall’erba and Le Gallo (2008) show that spatial growth 
spillovers are present in regional European data. Thus, there seems to be a risk of ignoring 
possible biases in not taking these into account. 
In terms of Mohl and Hagens (2010) problems this thesis will, by employing a quasi- 
experimental method and explicitly modelling spatial growth spillover, mainly try to account 
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for the problems (2), (3) and (4). Problem (1) is more difficult handle and is related to data 
quality and coverage of European data at the regional level. This is something that hopefully 
will improve over time. An additional problem associated with (1) is that only data on 
Objective 1-fund commitment is available in this thesis, as opposed to the real usage of funds. 
It would of course be of great help to the analysis to have readily available data on how much 
and on what each Objective-1 region really spend of their allotted funds. 
4. Empirical specification 
4.1 The nuts and bolts of regression-discontinuity design (RDD) 
The problem often faced in non-experimental settings is endogeneity. The consequence of this 
is that the explanatory variables can be correlated with the residuals and thus any estimates 
run the risk of being biased. As discussed above, and pointed out by Mohl and Hagen (2010), 
endogeneity is a problem affecting much of the previous literature on the effect of regional 
transfers on growth.  
Furthermore, as pointed out in the theoretical section of this thesis, it can be expected that the 
poorest regions will have a higher average growth rate than richer regions due to diminishing 
returns, but these are also the regions that get transfers aimed at increasing growth rates. Thus, 
simple regressions on regional growth mix up this causal effect of capital accumulation and 
the causal effect of transfers on growth. This problem of simultaneity also causes endogeneity 
and biased estimates. Also, as seen in e.g. equation (6) above, there are theoretical reasons to 
believe that several variables affect the growth process of regions. Not accounting for all these 
in an empirical specification can also yield biased estimates due to endogeneity based on 
omitted variables. This thesis employs RDD to be able to find a casual effect of Objective 1 
transfer on regional growth rates, in an attempt to solve these two endogeneity problems. 
In an experimental setting it would be possible to have a treatment and control group of 
regions, where the two groups would be comparable and the only difference would be that the 
treatment group is given a transfer. This setting is of course a golden standard, which is not 
possible to reach in reality. However, it is possible to mimic this setup in a quasi-experimental 
setting, such as RDD. In the RDD-setting (see e.g. Angrist and Pischke 2009, chapter 6; 
Imbens and Lemieux 2007; Lee and Lemieux 2009; and, in the context of regional transfers, 
Becker et al. 2010) this is archived by exploiting arbitrary set rules or thresholds. The above 
mentioned 75%-rule for Objective 1 fund eligibility can be thought of such a threshold.  
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Intuitively, think of two regions, one with a GRP per capita of 74% of the EU-average and 
one with a GRP per capita of 76% of the average, the RDD relies on that these two regions 
are not too dissimilar, so that in a comparison the only thing that are significantly different 
between the regions is that one is treated with regional transfers while the other is not. This 
way it is possible to work around the problems of endogeneity. However, note the trade-off: 
as the window around the threshold is widened, the number of observations increases and so 
does the efficiency of the estimates, but, at the same time the comparability of the regions 
decreases, and thus the risk of biased estimates increases. 
It is also important to note that the estimate in an RDD-setting is the local average treatment 
effect (LATE) (Lee and Lemieux 2007, p.23). Thus, in the case considered in this thesis we 
can only say something about the average effect of the Objective-1 funds on regions within 
the window. This means that results have a low external but high internal validity. Thus, it is 
only possible to discuss the results in the context of the included regions during the 2000-
2006 period.     
4.2 RDD-specification 
Following Becker et al (2010) the aim is to estimate the effect of Objective-1 treatment on 
regional growth rates in the 2000-2006 budgetary period, called period t. Drawing from 
equation (6) above, this could be stated as a linear regression of the following form (Angrist 
and Pischke 2009): 
                             (        )                       
            ,     (7) 
where,            is the average annual growth rate of region i in period t;   is a constant 
intercept term;            is the Objective-1 treatment in period t if p=0 or in the prior 
period if p=1;  (        ) is the forcing variable representing per-capita GRP of regions 
around the 75% threshold prior to period t, it is captured by a Pth-order polynomial (P=1 
implies a linear trend) and its intercept and trend can be allowed to differ at either side of the 
threshold;    is country-specific effects;        and        are the initial employment rate 
and initial share of agricultural industry in each region prior to period t, respectively;      is 
the spatially-weighted lag term of regions i's neighbor j’s growth rate in period t, meant to 
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capture spatial growth spillovers;       is an error term
6
; and,    to     are parameters to be 
estimated.  In RDD, if the variable            is positive and significant this suggests that 
regions, around the threshold, that receive the treatment of Objective-1 transfers in the 2000-
2006 period grew faster on average than comparable regions that did not.  
However, arguable, the effects of Objective-1 transfers are long-term in nature. Thus, both the 
short-term effects on the average growth rate in 2000-2006 of regions that received transfers 
in period 2000-2006 and the long-term effects on average growth rates in 2000-2006 of 
regions that received transfers in the prior period of 1994-1999 are investigated.    
From neoclassical theory, as discussed in chapter 2, it is expected that the initial per-capita 
GRP is negatively related to the average growth rate in period t. Additionally, the variables   , 
      ,        and        are included to capture regional differences discussed chapter 2. 
From theories on knowledge spillovers it is expected that the employment rate and growth 
spillovers from neighboring regions have a positive effect on a region’s average growth rate 
and a large share of agricultural employment is associated with a lagging growth rate (think of 
the peripheral region specialized in a constant returns industry in the core-periphery model). 
The country-fixed effects are meant to capture differences in e.g. technology, education or 
human capital as discussed in chapter 2. Possibly, such variables are not perfectly evenly 
distributed within each country. However, policies affecting them are usually set at the 
national level and arguably it is much easier for regions within the same country to share 
human capital and technology.  
Table 2. Eligible and non-eligible NUTS-3 regions over and under the 75-% threshold rule 
for Objective-1 funding. 
 
Treated Non-treated Total 
Eligible 316 65 381 
Non-eligible 102 734 836 
Total 418 799 1217 
 
This thesis employs NUTS-3 level regions as the main object of analysis. However, 
Objective-1 eligibility is set at the NUTS-2 level. Consequently, there is heterogeneity in per-
                                                 
6
 Note that it is not possible to include both the spatial-lag term and region-specific effects since the distance 
between regions are fixed over time. Instead country-specific effects,   , are introduced. That way there is still 
some variation in distances at the sub-national level. 
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capita GRP between NUTS-3 regions within the same NUTS-2 region. Indeed, as can be seen 
in Table 2, the 75% threshold for Objective-1 transfer is not followed in all cases. This means 
that some NUTS-3 regions receive transfers even though they are not eligible and some do not 
receive transfers even though they are eligible. As pointed out by Becker et al (2008) there is 
to some degree a random distribution of Objective-1 funds at the NUTS-3 level around the 
75%-threshold. However, this is not perfect since the likelihood of poor NUTS-2 regions 
containing poor NUTS-3 is fairly high. Moreover, the eastward expansion of the EU in 2004 
meant that the average per-capita GRP in the union was lowered. As a consequence many 
regions that previously were eligible for support then opted for a special “phasing-out” 
transfers under the Objetive-1 funds (EC 1999). Thus, in terminology of RDD, there is partial 
non-compliance to the rule (Angrist and Pischke 2009; Imbens and Lemieux 2008; and, Lee 
and Lemieux 2009). This calls for so called fuzzy RDD. 
Figure 1. Probability of Objective-1 treatment and the 75%-threshold 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the probability of receiving Objective-1 transfer given the initial per-capita 
GRP of NUTS-3 regions relative the EU average in 1999. Fuzzy RDD relies on the 
probability of treatment being less than unity. However, the probability of receiving treatment 
should increase the further down from the 75%-rule a region moves. In fuzzy RDD a two-
stage instrumental variable approach is needed as OLS estimations of (7) would yield biased 
estimates. Instead (7) may be instrumented with the following nonlinear first-stage regression: 
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 (            )                     (       )                       
              ,     (8) 
where  ,   ,    to   are parameters to be estimated, and     denotes a disturbance term. 
Hence, (8) estimates the probability of being treated with Objective-1 
transfers,  (            ), given the 75% rule,          . In this thesis a nonlinear probit 
estimator is employed. However, as Becker et al (2010) notes, the first-stage is just identified 
irrespective of whether a nonlinear or a linear probability model is used. However, even 
though a nonlinear model puts strong distributional assumptions on    , it tends to produce 
more efficient estimates as it uses more of the sample variation (see the nonlinear trend in 
Figure 1). In addition, linear probability models tend to suffer from heteroskedastic error 
terms (ibid). 
5. Results 
5.1 Data and descriptive statistics 
The sample consist of 1217 NUTS-3 regions in total. For the period entire 2000-2006 1 074 
regions from the EU15 are included. Additionally, for the period of 2004-2006, 143 regions 
from the new member states are included.
7
 The sample consists of 418 regions that received 
Objective-1 transfers in the 2000-2006 period and 277 regions that also received transfers 
during the 1994-1999 budgetary period. Objective-1 eligibility is set by the European 
Commission one year before each programming period. For the 1994-1999 period 
information on eligibility is listed in Council regulation 2081/93 and – for the 1995 members 
Austria, Sweden and Finland – in Official Journal L 001, 01/01/1995. For the period 2000-
2006 eligible regions are listed in Council Regulation 502/1999 and – for the new 2004 
members – in the Official Journal L 236, 23/09/2003. Data on per-capita GRP, employment 
share and agricultural share are collected from EUROSTAT’s regional database and – for 
Austria, Italy and some German regions – from the OECD.Stat’s regional database. Overseas 
regions are dropped from the dataset.
8
  
                                                 
7
 Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Hungary joined 
the EU in 2004. 
8
 The dropped regions are: the Spanish regions of El Hiero, Fuerteventura, Gran Canaria, La Gomera, La Palma, 
Lanzarote, Tenerife, Ceuta, and Melilla; the French overseas regions of Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyana and 
Réunion; and, the Portuguese island regions Acores and Madeira. 
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During the 2000-2006 period the Objective-1 funds amounted to 70% of EU’s Structural Fund 
Program, i.e. 137€ billion (European Commission 2007, p.202). The Structural Fund program 
amounted to about one third of the total EU budget, or 195€ billion, for the 2000-2006 period 
(ibid).  
Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
 
All regions 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GRPpc PPS, 1999 17851.17 7619.994 3199.999 102000 
AAG GRPpc, 2000- 
2006 
0.040225 0.018956 -0.03123 0.1957 
Employment share, 1999 0.425797 0.103166 0.214505 0.943478 
Agricultar share, 1999 0.075334 0.092418 0 0.652908 
 
Untreated regions 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GRPpc PPS, 1999 20907.91 7278.421 7229.494 102000 
AAG GRPpc, 2000- 
2006 
0.035426 0.012554 -0.00109 0.107132 
Employment share, 1999 0.448218 0.109987 0.235207 0.943478 
Agricultar share, 1999 0.042389 0.040931 0 0.322068 
 
Treated regions 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GRPpc PPS, 1999 12008.26 3977.119 3199.999 36800 
AAG GRPpc, 2000- 
2006 
0.049398 0.024854 -0.03123 0.1957 
Employment share, 1999 0.38294 0.071288 0.214505 0.663492 
Agricultar share, 1999 0.138309 0.125082 0 0.652908 
 
Table 3 shows a range of statistical moments of the variables included in the sample, as well 
as for the subsamples of treated and untreated NUTS-3 regions. The included moments are the 
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mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values of initial per-capita GRP (in PPS), 
the average annual growth rate (AAG GRPpc) during 2000-2006, as well as the covariates, 
the initial employment share (in total population) and the initial agricultural share (in total 
employment).  
Some general observations can be learned from Table 3. First, the treated regions have a 
lower mean per-capita income compared to the untreated regions; in general they also grow 
faster than untreated regions. This gives credence to the hypothesis that poorer regions 
converge to richer, possible with the help of Object-1 transfers. However, the treated regions 
also have the lowest growth rate and the untreated regions have the highest growth rate during 
the period. Additionally, treated regions also show a greater span of growth rates. Secondly, 
treated regions in general have lower employment and higher share of agricultural industry. 
Further indicating the general peripheral nature of treated regions. 
Figure 2. Average annual growth rate 2000-2006 and the 75%-threshold 
 
Note: The figure shows average regional annual growth rates in equally sized 2.5% bins. 
The graph represents a 2
nd
 -degree local polynomial functions. 
 
Figure 2 plots NUTS-3 regions’ average annual per-capita GRP growth rate against their 
initial per-capita GRP relative the EU average. The regions are plotted in equally sized bins of 
2.5% based on their average growth rates and the trend is plotted as a 2
nd
-degree local 
.0
3
5
.0
4
.0
4
5
.0
5
.0
5
5
.0
6
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 a
n
n
a
u
l 
G
R
P
p
c
 g
ro
w
th
 r
a
te
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 10
0
Initial GRPpc relative to EU average, %
23 
 
polynomial function. Indeed, Figure 2 illustrates a clear discontinuity around the 75%-rule. 
Thus, RDD seems a fitting identification strategy in the case of the effect of the Objective-1 
funds to promote growth. However, as pointed out by Lee and Lemiuex (2009), the graphical 
representations should not be considered alone, as different functional forms of the trends 
around the rule can give different answers as to the existence of a discontinuity. Instead, the 
graphical representation should be complemented with a range of estimations and sensitivity 
checks, testing the credibility of the jump. 
5.2 Baseline estimations 
Table 4 shows the baseline RDD estimations.
9
 All estimations are done in a window 
consisting of regions with initial per-capita GRP of between 50 and 125% of the EU average. 
Outcome is the average annual per-capita GRP growth rate over the 2000-2006 period. 
Table 4. RDD baseline estimations 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Outcome Outcome Outcome 
    
Objective-1 status 0.0155*** 0.0159*** 0.0140** 
 (0.00254) (0.00547) (0.00616) 
GRPpc, 1999  -0.00922
 
0.00168 
  (0.00890) (0.00886) 
Employment rate, 1999  0.0479*** 0.0111 
  (0.0139) (0.0120) 
Agricultural rate, 1999  -0.0388*** -0.0269** 
  (0.0123) (0.0124) 
Spatially lagged outcome   0.799*** 
   (0.164) 
Constant 0.0340*** 0.107 -0.0149 
 (0.000883) (0.0836) (0.0817) 
    
Country-specific effects NO NO NO 
Observations 885 885 885 
Adj R-squared 0.0283 0.0784 0.200 
White’s robust HEC standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
# 
p<0.15 
                                                 
9
 The first-stage estimations are shown in appendix 2. 
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In estimation (1) the average annual growth rate over the period is simply regressed on the 
Objective-1 treatment status. In this case it is evident that treatment yields a significant and 
positive effect on the growth rate. Regions that receive transfers on average grow 1.56 % (the 
exponent of the Objective-1 status estimate) faster than regions that do not. However, looking 
at the adjusted R-squared reveals that very little of the variation is explained by this 
specification. 
Next in Table 4, estimation (2) adds the initial level of per-capita GRP, employment and 
agricultural specialization as covariates in the specification. In the two latter cases both 
variables are significant and show the expected sign. A higher employment is associated with 
a higher average growth rate and a higher specialization in agricultural industry is associated 
with a lower rate. The initial per-capita GRP have the expected sign but is shown to be 
insignificant at the 15%-level. The effect of Objective-1 treatment is still positive and 
significant and in terms of size comparable to estimation (1); regions that receive transfers on 
average grow about 1.6 % faster than other regions in the sample. 
In chapter 3 it was suggested that growth spillovers have a strong localized-geographical 
component. Accordingly, finally in Table 4, estimation (3) adds the spatially-lagged growth 
rates of neighboring regions. Indeed, the spatially-autoregressive term is significant and 
positive implying that per-capita income growth among neighbors is strongly linked to a 
region’s own average growth rate. This further implies the importance of economic linkages 
between regions giving rise to growth clusters, i.e. relative high-growth regions tend to be 
close to other high-growth clusters. This is in line with the findings of Dall’erba (2005), 
Dall’erba and Le Gallo (2008) and Ramajo et al (2008) among others. Further underlining the 
importance of spatial spillovers the explanatory power of the specification increases 
dramatically when including the spatial lag, as is evident when looking at the adjusted R-
squared value of specification (3), 0.2 compared to 0.07 in estimation (2). 
Furthermore, in estimation (3) initial per-capita GRP is still insignificant and now 
employment is also insignificant. That employment is insignificant when spatial growth 
spillovers are accounted for can imply that a region’s own labor market is not as important in 
relation to its growth as its neighborhood. Instead, what is important is labor flows between 
regions in the entire regional cluster. Indeed, estimations show that including a spatial lag of 
the employment rate in a similar specification yields a significant and positive estimate.
10
  
                                                 
10
 See appendix 3 for the additional estimation including spatial lags of independent variables.  
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This can indicate the importance of labor mobility as a source of knowledge spillovers as 
pointed out by e.g. Glaesser et al (1992). 
However, specialization patterns seem to still influence the growth outcome, as the 
agricultural rate is still significant and showing the expected sign in estimation (3). Lastly, 
Objective-1 status continues to be positive and significant, albeit somewhat smaller in size 
compared to the earlier estimates; now recipient regions grow at a 1.4% higher rate on 
average than non-recipient regions. 
Table 5. Baseline RDD with country-fixed effects 
 (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES outcome outcome outcome 
    
Objective-1 status 0.0133*** 0.00708** 0.00489
# 
 (0.00225) (0.00278) (0.00302) 
GRPpc, 1999  -0.00731 -0.00828 
  (0.00637) (0.00621) 
Employment rate, 1999  0.0102 0.00898 
  (0.0140) (0.0136) 
Agricultural rate, 1999  -0.00972 -0.00976 
  (0.0105) (0.0102) 
Spatially lagged outcome   0.288* 
   (0.164) 
Constant 0.0367*** 0.106* 0.105* 
 (0.00180) (0.0583) (0.0555) 
    
Country-specific effects YES YES YES 
Observations 798 798 798 
Adj R-squared 0.317 0.359 0.368 
White’s robust HEC standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
# 
p<0.15 
Table 5 shows similar specifications as Table 4, however adds country-specific effects to the 
estimations. Objective-1 status is significant at the 10%-level in specification (4) and (5) and 
at the 15%-level in specification (6). Thus, no strong conclusions should be drawn from the 
estimate in (6). However, they might indicate that with a larger sample and more efficient 
estimates the Objective-1 status would show stronger significance also in this specification. It 
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seems clear that increasing the sample size over more budgetary periods is something that 
should be pursued in the future.  
What is more, adding country-specific effects in Table 5 reduces the effect of Objective-1 
status compared to the estimates in Table 4. This indicates the country affiliation of a region 
plays a crucial role in the efficiency of the Objective-1 transfers. Also note that the 
explanatory power of the specifications have increased in Table 5 compared to Table 4.   
In addition, the added country-specific effects in Table 5 explains so much of the variation in 
growth rates that adding it removes the significance of all covariates except the spatially 
lagged outcome, though this is markedly reduced in size. This further emphasizes the 
importance of country affiliation on regional growth outcomes. Namely, spatial spillovers are 
weaker between countries, indicating that there are still some barriers to spillovers and/or 
factor mobility between countries in the EU.  
The results thus far indicate that Objective-1 transfers can be important to stimulate the 
average growth of regions, with an average treatment effect of about 0.5-1.5 % higher growth 
rate for treated regions depending on specification. In size these estimates are comparable to 
the ones found by Becker et al. (2010), employing a similar RDD for the period 1989-2006. 
However, the transfers are not nearly as important for the growth outcome of regions as 
country affiliation. Likewise, neither the initial income level nor other initial covariates are 
important when spatial growth spillovers and country dummies are included. 
5.3 Changing the parametric function of the forcing variable 
Up to now it has been assumed that the forcing variable, per-capita GRP in 1999, has the 
same linear functional form at either side of the 75%-threshold. However, this is not 
necessarily the case. For example, it is possible that the perceived discontinuity really is 
indicative of nonlinearity instead of a jump at the threshold (see e.g. Angrist and Pischke 
2009, p. 254f.). In that case it is possible that the estimated effect of the Objective-1 transfers 
do not really show the average effect of treatment, but rather an unaccounted nonlinearity. 
Thus, it is important to control for this possibility. 
In Table 6 specification (7) and (8) are analogue to specification (3) and (6) in Table 4 and 5, 
respectively, with the addition of the quadrat of the forcing variable. The size and significance 
of the average treatment effect of Objective-1 status in specification (7) and (8) are in parity 
with the estimates in the corresponding estimations above. Including country-fixed effects 
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more than the halves the average effect of Objective-1 treatment and reduces the spatially-
autoregressive term in size by about three fourths. 
Table 6. RDD with symmetric polynomial 
 (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Outcome Outcome 
   
Objective 1 status 0.0122* 0.00459
# 
 (0.00646) (0.00291) 
GRPpc 1999 -0.414
# 
-0.442** 
 (0.256) (0.175) 
2
nd
-order polynomial of FORCE  0.0215
# 
0.0224** 
 (0.0130) (0.00907) 
Occupation rate 1999 0.00998 0.00654 
 (0.0118) (0.0137) 
Agricultural rate 1999 -0.0263** -0.00849 
 (0.0122) (0.00996) 
Spatially Lagged outcome 0.810*** 0.297* 
 (0.172) (0.162) 
Constant 2.000 2.197*** 
 (1.253) (0.847) 
   
Country-specific effects NO YES 
Observations 885 798 
Adj R-squared 0.218 0.372 
White’s robust HEC standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
# 
p<0.15 
In addition, in estimation (8) the forcing variable and its quadrat are significant and the signs 
indicate a negative exponential relationship between initial per-capita GRP and the average 
annual growth rate. The signs of these variables are the same in specification (7), which are 
significant at the 15%-level. Also, looking at the adjusted R-squared the specification in Table 
6 explains more of the sample variation than the previously discussed correspondent 
estimations. Thus, it seems important to add the quadrat to the specification.   
Furthermore, allowing the forcing variable to have a different intercept at any side of the 
threshold do not seem to increase the explanatory power of the specifications, regardless if the 
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quadrat is included or not. The size, sign and significance of estimates, as well as the 
explanatory power of the specification, are in line with the ones presented in Table 6.
11
  
5.4 Sensitivity and robustness checks 
So far the regions included in the estimations have been in a fairly large window around the 
75%-threshold. However, as discussed above, even though this increases the efficiency of 
estimates in the RDD the size of the window also increases the risk of biased estimates, due to 
the regions included not being fully comparable. Thus, it is important to control the sensitivity 
of the estimates to changing the size of the window (Lee and Lemieux 2009). 
In Table 7 the window around the 75-% threshold is decreased to four subsamples. Firstly, to 
a window containing regions with per-capita GRP of 50-110% relative the EU average; 
secondly, to regions within a 50-100% window; thirdly, to a window of regions within the 60-
90% window; and, lastly, to a window containing regions within a window of 70-80% of the 
EU average per-capita GRP.  
As can be seen in panel (I) in Table 7, which is analogue to specification (7) in Table 5, the 
significance and size of the estimates decrease after each consecutive reduction in window 
size, until the 70-80% -window where both the significance and size of the estimate suddenly 
jumps. Before this the size of the estimates are in line with previous estimates.  
Thus, looking at Table 7, there seem to be strong treatment effect just around the 75%-
threshold. Possible explanations for this can be that either lower- or higher-income regions 
bias the previous estimates downwards. It is, for example, possible that low-income regions 
lack the absorptive capacity, due to lacking local institutions or competences. This can hinder 
their ability to really take advantage of the Objective-1 transfers (cf. Caragliu and Nijkamp 
2008; Rodriguez-Pose and Crecenzi 2008). As discussed in Chapter 2, both endogenous 
growth theory and NEG point to that human capital, e.g. education level or skills, as of 
outmost determinants in the growth outcome of regions. Also, Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi 
(2004) found that Structural Fund payments aimed at promoting e.g. education is more 
efficient compared to other funds. Moreover, it is equally plausible that the effect of 
Objective-1 transfers on high-income regions is relatively weaker. Indeed, neoclassical theory 
would predict something similar; as these regions have a higher capital-labor ratio the effects 
of further investments in physical capital through the Objective-1 transfers would increase 
growth to smaller extent due to diminishing returns.  
                                                 
11
 The estimations are presented in appendix 4. 
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Table 7. Changing the window around the 75%-threshold 
(I) Estimated model as in specification (7) in Table 5 
Window, % Objective-1 status Observations 
50–110 0.0111288** 
(0.0054773) 
719 
50–100 0.0140639# 
(0.0094591) 
601 
60–90 0.0071783 
(0.0135122) 
363 
70–80 0.0251221* 
(0.0146519) 
146 
(II) Estimated model as in specification (8) in Table 5 
Window, % Objective-1 status Observations 
50–110 -0.0001345 
(0.0037067) 
618 
50–100 -0.001521 
(0.0043252) 
502 
60–90 0.0093878 
(0.0092392) 
279 
70–80 0.0130335 
(0.0227057) 
103 
White’s robust HEC standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
# 
p<0.15 
 
Turning to panel (II) in Table 7, which is analogue to specification (8) in in Table 6, thus 
accounting for country-fixed effects, all significance of the estimates disappear. Moreover, the 
signs of the estimates in two largest windows change to negative, albeit their sizes are 
minuscular. However, around the two smallest windows, 60-90% and 70-80%, the sign 
becomes positive again and the size is comparable to previous estimates on the average 
treatment effect, although the estimates are still insignificant. Yet, without making any real 
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interpretation, the results shown in panel II somewhat corroborates those found in in panel I 
of Table 6.  
Additionally, the results in panel II of Table 7 once again point to the importance of country 
affiliation. Country-specific effects seem to capture most variation in the treatment effect of 
the Objective-1 transfers. These results point to national institutions and the general economic 
policies being the real determinant of effectiveness of regional transfers. Indeed, as discussed 
above, Martin (1999) pointed to several policies usually determined at the national level when 
discussing a good regional policy, e.g. increased competition on labor and goods markets or 
educational policies.  
Another assumption underlining RDD is that the included covariates should not be affected by 
the threshold. If this is the case the detected treatment effect in the estimations above could be 
an artifact of one of the covariates also “jumping” at the threshold (Imbens and Lemieux 
2009). Figure 3 plots the covariates, employment and agricultural share around the 75%-rule, 
in equally sized 2.5% bins. As is evident no “jump” can be detected neither for employment 
nor agriculture. Thus, the RDD-estimations seem credible and robust.  
Figure 3. Covariates and the 75%-threshold
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Note: The figure shows respective covariate in equally sized 2.5% bins. The graph 
represents a 2
nd
 -degree local polynomial functions. 
 
Lastly, RDD can be biased if the distribution of observations differs markedly or are not 
randomly assigned on either side of the threshold (Ibid). Figure 4 plots the distribution of 
regions based on their per-capita GRP relative to the EU average. No systematic differences 
in distribution can be detected around the 75%-rule. To make this clearer the kernel density 
distribution is plotted as well, as can be seen no large change happens in the distribution 
around the threshold.  Thus, the RDD-strategy seems robust in this case as well. 
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Figure 4. Distribution of regions and the 75%-threshold 
 
Note: The figure show the kernel density function with Epanechnikov kernel and where a 
bandwidth that minimizes the mean integrated square error is chosen.  
 
5.5 The long-term effects of Objective-1 transfers 
As pointed out by Becker et al (2010) it is possible that the effect of Objective-1 transfers 
accumulate over time. To test if this is the case the growth outcomes of regions that also 
received Objective-1 transfers in the budgetary period of 1994-1999 are investigated.  
In Table 8 specification (I) and (II) corresponds to specification (7) and (8) in Table 6, 
however only considers the subsample of regions that received Objective-1 transfers in the 
1994-1999 budgetary period. For most variables the estimates are in line with those reported 
above. However, in specification (I) the estimate of the average treatment effect is 
insignificant, which in itself is not surprising since, as was discussed above, the older member 
states have relatively higher per-capita incomes and it would be expected that these would 
grow slower due to diminishing returns. However, the treatment effect is significant when 
considering specification (II).  
Thus, when taking country-specific effects into consideration the average long-term treatment 
effect among regions of the old EU member states is significant. The size of the estimate 
suggests that, when taking country-specific effects into account, regions that received 
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transfers in the 1994-1999 period grew about 0.5% faster on average. Thus, some old member 
states in the EU15 have been “better” at absorbing Objective-1 funds, to such a degree that the 
transfers explain the longer-term growth of their regions outcomes. However, a general long-
term effect cannot be found when looking only at regions. This once again emphasizes the 
importance of country policies and institutions in absorbing regional transfers, particularly in 
the longer term time perspective. 
Table 8. Long-term effects of Objective-1 transfers 
 (I) (II) 
VARIABLES Outcome in 
2000-2006 
Outcome in 
2000-2006 
   
Objective-1 status in 1994-1999 0.00604 0.00531* 
 (0.00578) (0.00297) 
GRPpc 1999 -0.369* -0.409** 
 (0.213) (0.175) 
2
nd
-order polynomial of FORCE 0.0189* 0.0208** 
 (0.0108) (0.00908) 
Occupation rate 1999 0.00389 0.00703 
 (0.0110) (0.0137) 
Agricultural rate 1999 -0.0176 -0.00896 
 (0.0118) (0.0100) 
Spatially Lagged outcome 0.982*** 0.242
#
 
 (0.135) (0.164) 
Constant 1.802* 2.041** 
 (1.043) (0.849) 
   
Country-specific effects NO YES 
Observations 841 784 
Adj R-squared 0.199 0.334 
White’s robust HEC standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
# 
p<0.15 
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6. Conclusion  
This thesis aims to investigate the effect of regional transfers on the growth performance of 
EU NUTS-3 regions during the 2000-2006 budgetary period. The theoretically predictions, as 
well as the prior empirical evidence, on how transfers affect regional growth are varied. 
Neoclassical theory show how transfer can speed up the convergence process, either in an 
absolute or a conditional sense, due to diminishing returns to capital investments. On the other 
hand, endogenous growth theory and NEG show that the existence of increasing returns 
and/or agglomeration economies can imply that regions need not converge. Instead, a 
situation where relatively high-income regions continue to grow faster than low-income 
regions, i.e.  diverge, is a possibility.  
Consequently, if these divergence forces are stronger than convergence forces, regional 
transfers may fail in their aim to promote regional income cohesion. A line of theoretical 
models show how transfers to low-income regions may even damper overall aggregate growth 
in the economy due to the existence of agglomeration economies and endogenous growth 
dynamics. Specifically, in the presence of positive externalities to investments in human 
capital and innovation giving rise to increasing returns, scale economies to production and 
transactions costs a trade-off between, on the one hand, aggregate growth and, on the other, 
regional income equity emerges. Martin (1999) shows that, in such a world, regional transfers 
may actually worsen overall welfare in the economy as it diverts capital from regions where it 
is productive to regions where it will be less productive. Therefore, since the welfare effects 
of regional transfers are ambiguous, it is argued that investigating the outcomes of said 
transfers are of great importance.    
Empirically, the prior results on the effect of regional transfer on regional growth 
performance in Europe are varied. Mohl and Hagen (2010) point to several problems 
afflicting the prior empirical literature. Foremost is the problem of endogeneity and thus 
biased estimates on account of omitted variables or simultaneity. This thesis tries to account 
for these problems by employing a quasi-experimental RDD-method, exploiting the arbitrary 
set 75-% rule for Objective-1 fund eligibility, to compare the per-capita GRP growth effect of 
transfers on recipient NUTS-3 regions to the growth of comparable non-recipient regions 
during the 2000-2006 budgetary period. The analysis is similar to that carried out by Becker 
et al. (2010), but focuses on more disaggregated regional data, accounts for spatial spillovers 
and explicitly looks at the long-term effects of transfers.  
35 
 
The findings point towards a positive effect of Objective-1 funds to promote per-capita 
income growth in recipient regions. This is in line with several recent contributions to the 
literature (see e.g.  Ramajo et al. 2008; Becker et al. 2010; Mohl and Hagen 2010; and Becker 
et al. 2012). However, when country-specific effects and spatial spillovers are controlled for 
the estimates are reduced by almost two thirds. This is interpreted as country association 
being of great importance in explaining the effectiveness of the transfers in promoting growth. 
Moreover, the spatial spillovers are reduced in size when country affiliation is accounted for, 
raising questions on how strong growth spillovers over national borders in the EU really are. 
The estimates in are robust to various sensitivity checks. 
Furthermore, when reducing the window around the 75%-threshold the effect of Objective-1 
transfers first lessens. However, in the smallest window, containing regions with a per-capita 
GRP of 70-80% of the average per-capita GRP in the EU, the treatment effect suddenly 
becomes much stronger. Moreover, when accounting for country affiliation the treatment 
effect of the transfers becomes minuscular, until the smallest windows when the estimates 
suddenly become positive (however, still insignificant). One possible explanation for this 
pointed out in the literature is the absorptive capacity of regions (see e.g. Caragliu and 
Nijkamp 2008; Rodriguez-Pose and Crecenzi 2008). This is related to the ability of the 
recipient regions to use their allotted funds on productive investments. Thus, it is possible that 
a subset of relatively high-income recipient regions share certain intuitional characteristics 
that make them more absorbent to the Objective-1 transfers.  
The findings discussed above are corroborated by the findings when looking at the long-term 
effects of the funds. Here no general treatment effect among recipient regions that received 
Objective-1 transfers during the 1994-1999 budgetary period is found. However, when 
country-specific effects are accounted for the treatment effect is suddenly becomes 
significant, possibly indicating that regions in some countries have been able to utilize 
transfers to generate a stronger growth outcome during the period. Thus, this further point to a 
subset of countries or regions that do better at exploiting regional transfers.  
The findings point towards an interesting future line of research. Who are these successful 
regions and countries and what are their characteristics? To characterize such successful and 
less successful regions can have important policy implications as it point towards a possible 
“not-all-shoes-fit” policy approach to regional transfers. For instance, there can be reason to, 
in conjunction with the transfers, also promote other institutional changes among recipient 
regions. The policies pointed out by Martin (1999), as generally important for the 
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effectiveness of regional transfers, could be examples on such institutional changes that 
should be promoted.    
Lastly, it should be pointed out that, on account of the chosen RDD identification strategy, the 
above results have a strong internal but a weak external validity. To try to remedy this and get 
more general results increasing the number of budgetary periods considered is essential. Also, 
adding more covariates to ensure the internal validity of the results is important. Moreover, as 
not all Objective-1 funds are used, obtaining data on the real usage of the funds in each region 
is imperative if the aim is to study the real effect of the funds in promoting growth in the 
future.         
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Appendix 1 
The spatial weighting matrix assigns each region a neighborhood where the neighbors are 
thought to share spatial dependency. In this thesis a weight matrix based of inverse-squared 
geographical distance in kilometers between regional centroids is used.  
Specifically, a distance-based weight matrix,  , is specified where the distance is the 
squared-inverse of the great-circle distance between each region’s centroid. Moreover, a 
critical cut-off point is implemented, above which spatial dependence is assumed to be zero. 
Lastly the distance matrix is row-standardized
12
 so that each row sums to one, this done so 
that it is the relative and not the absolute distance that matters. This will also give bounded 
estimates of the spatial-autoregressive coefficients, making these easier to interpret. Hence, 
the spatial weight matrix is defined as, 
  {
            
    
 
   
           
              
,    (A.1.1) 
where the element     is the spatial interaction between region i and j,     is the great-circle 
distance in kilometers between regions i and j’s centroids and   is the critical cut-off point. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 That is,     
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Appendix 2 
Table A2.1. First-stage regressions corresponding to 
 estimations 1-4 in Table 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Outcome Outcome Outcome 
Pr(treatment) 0.8535*** 1.0605*** 1.0514*** 
 
(0.04278) (0.10559) (0.10084) 
GRPpc, 1999 
 
-0.0190404 -0.0478377 
  
(0.15546) (0.15083) 
Employment rate, 1999 
 
0.063275 0.0687259 
  
(0.25183) (0.27061) 
Agricultural rate, 1999 
 
-0.135154 -0.126366 
  
(0.13855) (0.14595) 
Spatially lagged outcome 
  
-1.144681 
   
(1.58118) 
Constant 0.0708764 0.1514031 0.4747841 
 
(0.019781) (1.488249) (1.449894) 
White’s robust HEC standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
# 
p<0.15 
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Table A2.2. First-stage regressions corresponding to 
estimations 5-6 in Table 5 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Outcome Outcome Outcome 
Pr(treatment) 0.9135487*** 1.217705*** 1.203832*** 
 
(0.07535) (0.08752) (0.07928) 
GRPpc, 1999 
 
0.2776288
#
 0.2211809 
 
 
(0.17196) (0.160456) 
Employment rate, 
1999 
 
-0.37056 -0.3169 
 
 
(0.41556) (0.41039) 
Agricultural rate, 
1999 
 
-0.03449 0.02658 
 
 
(0.36817) (0.36839) 
Spatially lagged 
outcome 
  
-4.4573 
 
  
(3.17541) 
Constant 0.0498623 -2.4824
#
 -1.779282 
  (0.08627) (1.611236) (1.508758) 
White’s robust HEC standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
# 
p<0.15 
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Table A2.3. First-stage regressions corre-
sponding to estimations 7-8 in Table 6 
  (7) (8) 
Variables Outcome Outcome 
Pr(treatment) 1.063533 1.195135 
 
(0.10109) (0.07842) 
GRPpc, 1999 3.428328 23.25475 
 
(4.808267) (4.484512) 
2
nd
-order polynomial of 
FORCE -.1796449 -.0885114 
 
(0.248893) (0.23076) 
Employment rate, 1999 .0786526 -.5253654 
 
(0.273522) (0.414645) 
Agricultural rate, 1999 -.1327368 .0565799 
 
(0.143654) (0.37181) 
Spatially lagged 
outcome -1.242793 -4.94549 
 
(1.61017) (3.14355) 
Constant -16.33784 -10.35661 
  (23.2548) (21.8188) 
White’s robust HEC standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
# 
p<0.15 
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Appendix 3 
Table A3.1. Baseline RDD with spatial lags of independent variables 
 (1) 
VARIABLES outcome 
  
Objective 1 status 0.00438 
 (0.00336) 
GRPpc 1999 -0.0163*** 
 (0.00601) 
Occupation rate 1999 0.0380*** 
 (0.0144) 
Agricultural rate 1999 -0.0340** 
 (0.0158) 
First order spatially lagged GRP -0.0185** 
 (0.00932) 
First order spatially lagged employment rate 0.0461*** 
 (0.0177) 
First order spatially lagged agricultural rate 0.00981 
 (0.0269) 
Constant 0.343*** 
 (0.0935) 
  
Observations 885 
Adj R-squared 0.147 
White’s robust HEC standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
# 
p<0.15 
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Appendix 4 
Table A4.1. RDD with asymmetric polynomials 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES outcome outcome outcome outcome 
     
Objective 1 status 0.0118
# 
0.0158
# 
0.00440
# 
0.00446 
 (0.00716) (0.00966) (0.00299) (0.00319) 
FORCE, below threshold 0.00218 0.197 -0.00237 -0.223 
 (0.00789) (0.766) (0.00629) (0.442) 
FORCE, above threshold 0.00198 0.164 -0.00277 -0.227 
 (0.00796) (0.725) (0.00624) (0.422) 
Occupation rate 1999 0.0125 0.00574 0.00786 0.00644 
 (0.0119) (0.0139) (0.0136) (0.0139) 
Agricultural rate 1999 -0.0243* -0.0300* -0.00689 -0.00694 
 (0.0131) (0.0153) (0.0100) (0.00994) 
Spatially Lagged outcome 0.814*** 0.787*** 0.286* 0.291* 
 (0.173) (0.180) (0.161) (0.162) 
2
nd
-order polynomial of FORCE, below 
threshold 
 -0.0113  0.0112 
  (0.0410)  (0.0236) 
2
nd
-order polynomial of FORCE, above 
threshold 
 -0.00787  0.0116 
  (0.0367)  (0.0215) 
Constant -0.0188 -0.843 0.0508 1.137 
 (0.0728) (3.575) (0.0564) (2.067) 
     
Country-specific effects NO NO YES YES 
Observations 885 885 798 798 
Adj R-squared 0.220 0.181 0.373 0.373 
White’s robust HEC standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
# 
p<0.15 
 
 
 
 
